Israel is building six new training bases for its ground forces. At first, that sounds like concrete, accommodation and a fairly large construction budget. In reality, it is about much more: training time, operational readiness and the question of what consequences the Israeli army is drawing from October 7, 2023, all the way into its everyday structures.
According to a report by Jerusalem Post, which is based on reporting by Walla and information from a senior official in Israel’s Defense Ministry, new or fundamentally renovated training sites are to be established for the 7th, 188th and 401st Armored Brigades, as well as for Kfir, Nahal and Givati.
The Defense Ministry explicitly views the projects as more than an improvement to accommodation. They are intended to directly help prepare the training of ground forces for future wars and extraordinary operational situations.
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Six brigades and very different timelines
The six projects are by no means at the same stage. Some facilities are already being built, while others are still in the planning phase.
According to current planning, the new training site for the 188th Armored Brigade is to be handed over in August 2027. The site for the 7th Armored Brigade is scheduled to receive recruits for the first time in August 2028. New areas for the Kfir Brigade are also planned for 2028. Construction for the 401st Armored Brigade is currently scheduled to begin in 2027.
The Nahal Brigade’s training site is a multiyear new-construction and renovation project. Givati has the longest history: According to the Defense Ministry, the project had already been delayed for more than 15 years. Completion is currently not expected until 2031 or 2032.
These differences alone show that Israel is not suddenly bringing six entirely new projects out of the ground. In some cases, old plans are being revived; in others, existing facilities are being fundamentally altered, while new sites are being created elsewhere.
When travel time costs training time
One of the most striking changes concerns something that sounds rather unremarkable alongside tanks, drones and missiles: travel routes.
Accommodation, training areas and support facilities are to be brought significantly closer together. For the armored brigades, covered maintenance centers are planned directly next to the accommodation, rather than, as has sometimes been the case, several kilometers away. Tanks and Namer vehicles are to receive rapid access routes to the training areas. Dining halls, accommodation and other central areas are also to be arranged so that less training time is lost to unnecessary travel.
Modern simulators and new training technologies are being added. Specialist clinics, including physiotherapy, are planned for medical care.
The idea behind this is simple. Time that a recruit spends on long journeys, organizational procedures or avoidable infrastructure problems is not available for training.
That this is not a theoretical problem was already shown by an unannounced inspection by Israel’s State Comptroller in 2022. During his visit to the Kfir Brigade’s training site, soldiers reported that although training lasted eight months, logistical tasks took up a considerable portion of that time. Deficiencies were also identified in infrastructure, medical care and living conditions.
The Israeli State Comptroller subsequently recommended improvements, among other areas, in infrastructure, medical care, air conditioning and the provision of supplies to soldiers.
This gives the supposedly minor question of comfort a military dimension. A shower either works or it does not. A soldier either waits for medical care or can resume training. Training time is either used or consumed by avoidable problems.
October 7 is also changing the architecture
The clearest new component, however, concerns the security of the facilities themselves.
According to the Defense Ministry, the lessons of October 7, 2023, were explicitly taken into account during planning. The Hamas attack also targeted Israeli military sites, some of which were breached. The assumption that a training site was automatically located in a protected military rear area was dispelled within a matter of hours.
The new facilities are therefore intended to incorporate the protection of infrastructure, sheltered areas, external security and the ability to continue operating in a severe security situation from the planning stage onward.
This represents a fundamental change in perspective. A training base is no longer merely a place where soldiers are prepared for war. It must itself be prepared for a situation in which training suddenly becomes a real-world emergency.
The problems did not begin on October 7
Anyone who tells a story in which everything was suddenly rethought after the Hamas attack is oversimplifying matters. The Israeli army had been aware of some of the problems for years.
As early as January 2019, Ynet reported on highly advanced plans for new training bases for Nahal and Givati. Tens of millions of shekels had already been invested in the planning. Modern training areas, simulators, medical facilities and a more compact structure with shorter distances were planned.
The underlying idea was therefore already remarkably similar to what is now being presented as part of modernization. But construction did not initially take place.
In 2020, another priority prevailed
In August 2020, the reversal followed. Ynet reported at the time, that the planned new construction for Nahal and Givati had been halted or reduced to substantially smaller renovation projects.
A budget of around one billion shekels had been earmarked and approved for the two projects. The military leadership, however, decided to use the available funds instead, among other things, for combat armament for the air force and components of air defense.
This was not a secret conspiracy against warm showers, but a classic military prioritization decision. Money can only be spent once. The question is therefore not whether the decision was fundamentally understandable at the time, but what price other areas paid for it.
In Givati’s case, that price is particularly visible today. A training site whose fundamental renewal had already been planned years ago may, according to current planning, not be fully completed until the early 2030s.
The difference between comfort and operational readiness
It is precisely here that it is worth looking beyond the idea that better accommodation is a luxury problem.
Such problems had already been documented at Kfir before the war. And they apparently were not limited to that individual site. In a later general report, Israel’s State Comptroller found that appropriate living and infrastructure conditions have a direct impact on readiness and motivation. Deficiencies in accommodation, sanitary facilities, dining halls, kitchens and training areas can therefore also impair training, exercises and operational tasks.
October 7 did not create these structural problems. It merely made their military significance brutally clear once again.
Some of today’s modernization builds on plans that existed years before October 7. What is new above all is that protection, functionality during crises and the experience of the Hamas attack are now being explicitly incorporated into the planning of training sites.
Lessons are reflected not only in new weapons
After a military failure such as October 7, public debate inevitably focuses on the major questions: intelligence services, border security, chains of command, political responsibility and military strategy.
These questions do not disappear simply because new training facilities are being built. Concrete does not answer questions about an incorrect assessment of the situation. A simulator cannot replace effective leadership. And new accommodation does not prevent strategic miscalculations.
But armed forces consist of more than generals, combat aircraft and operational plans. They also consist of thousands of soldiers who must be trained, as well as medical care, logistics and infrastructure.
That is precisely where the significance of the six projects lies.
Israel is attempting not only to translate the experiences of recent years into new doctrines or weapons systems, but also into the everyday functioning of its ground forces. How soldiers are accommodated, how training is organized, how facilities can continue operating in a crisis and how much time actually remains for training are thereby themselves becoming part of security planning.
Catching up while rethinking at the same time
The six new training sites therefore tell two stories at once.
The first concerns October 7. Israel is attempting to make military facilities more resilient and prepare them for situations that apparently were not sufficiently taken into account in this form before the Hamas attack.
The second story reaches much further back. Old infrastructure, postponed new construction and problems known for years do not disappear simply because an army sets other priorities. At some point, the bill comes due.
Today, both developments are converging.
Israel is therefore not simply building six more modern barracks. It is attempting both to make up for what was neglected and to adapt its training to a security reality in which even the military rear area can no longer be assumed to be safe.
The fact that individual projects are not supposed to be completed until 2031 or 2032 also shows how long Israel will live with the consequences of earlier failures to act. The lessons of October 7 are acute; their structural implementation will take years.
The new training bases are therefore less a construction program than a visible part of a larger restructuring of Israel’s ground forces after October 7.
In the end, the decisive lesson is not found in the concrete. It lies in the realization that training, infrastructure, protection and operational readiness are not separate issues, but parts of the same military capability.
ℹ️ Factual Basis and Primary Sources for the Article 📑
▶️ Walla, August 23, 2026:
Six new training bases and the lessons of October 7
Original report on the six projects, their timelines, infrastructure measures, simulators, medical care and the security requirements explicitly derived from October 7.
▶️ Jerusalem Post, August 23, 2026:
IDF begins construction of six new training bases incorporating lessons from Oct. 7
English-language report based on the Walla investigation and information from a senior official in Israel’s Defense Ministry.
▶️ Israeli State Comptroller, October 2, 2022:
Living Conditions and Infrastructure for Conscripts and Reservists
Official inspection of the Kfir Brigade’s training site, with findings on training time, infrastructure, medical care and living conditions.
▶️ Israeli State Comptroller, 2023:
Infrastructure and Living Conditions in the Israeli Armed Forces
General report on the connection between infrastructure, living conditions, motivation, training and operational readiness.
▶️ Ynet, January 24, 2019:
Plans for New Training Bases for Nahal and Givati
Earlier report on the already well-advanced construction plans, their financing and the planned modernization of training.
▶️ Ynet, August 11, 2020:
Halt to the Planned New Construction for Nahal and Givati
Report on the decision to put the billion-shekel construction plans on hold and redirect funds toward other military priorities.
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