Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declares EU membership a secondary matter and claims that, in the end, it will be Europe—not Turkey—that loses. That is a powerful message for the domestic audience. But it does not tell the whole story: Turkey’s EU accession is not failing because Brussels has been keeping Ankara waiting outside the door for decades without reason. On key political issues, Ankara itself has moved increasingly farther away from the requirements for membership.
In a current interview with Al Jazeera Erdoğan stated that the European Union did not appear willing to admit Turkey anyway. Membership is no longer a priority for Ankara. Europe would thus become the loser.
This is precisely where it is worth looking behind the rhetoric. Turkey is economically and strategically important to Europe, but importance does not replace accession criteria. Anyone who wants to understand why the process has been stuck for years needs to look less at Erdoğan’s words and more at Cyprus, the rule of law, foreign-policy conflicts and Ankara’s own decisions.
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Why Turkey’s EU accession has been effectively deadlocked since 2018
Turkey’s path toward Europe is a long one. But long does not automatically mean unfair. Erdoğan’s recurring narrative of waiting for decades leaves out a crucial part: An accession process is not a queue in which a number is automatically called at some point. A candidate must meet the political, legal and economic requirements.
Turkey officially applied for membership in 1987 in what was then the European Economic Community. An institutional link had already existed since 1963 through the Ankara Agreement. Turkey received official EU candidate status in 1999, and the actual accession negotiations began in October 2005.
Since then, the process has made little progress. According to the Council of the EU and the European Council only 16 of the 35 negotiating chapters have been opened, and just one provisionally closed. The last accession conference took place as long ago as June 2016.
In June 2018, the Council noted that Turkey was moving further away from the European Union. Since then, the accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill. This is not a sudden European veto, but the result of a political development in which Ankara itself has played a considerable part.
ℹ️ The matter of the “53 years”
Erdoğan’s familiar claim that Turkey had been left waiting at Europe’s door for 53 years dates from 2016. At the time, he was referring to the 1963 Ankara Agreement. In the current Al Jazeera report from August 2026, this figure is not mentioned. Today, 63 years would have passed since the Ankara Agreement. Above all, however, an association agreement is not the same thing as 63 years of ongoing accession negotiations.
Cyprus: A conflict that has remained unresolved for decades
One of the toughest obstacles between Ankara and Brussels is Cyprus. And here the issue becomes more concrete than abstract debates about “European values”: An EU candidate country does not recognize an EU member state and has exercised military control over the northern part of that state for decades.
The Republic of Cyprus became independent in 1960. Its constitution provided for power-sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot community. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom became guarantor powers. Serious intercommunal clashes began as early as 1963. For this reason, the UN peacekeeping force UNFICYP was deployed in 1964 and remains in operation to this day.
In July 1974, forces linked to the Greek military junta and the organization EOKA-B staged a coup against President Makarios. The aim was to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkey then intervened militarily and brought the northern part of the island under its control in two operations.
Since then, Cyprus has been de facto divided. In the south, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus exercises governmental authority. In the north, the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” internationally recognized only by Turkey, has existed since 1983. Between them runs the Green Line controlled by the United Nations.
This is not a frozen historical episode. The European Court of Human Rights has established Turkey’s responsibility on the basis of its effective overall control over the north. UN reports have also addressed over the years the settlement of people from Turkey and the resulting change in the demographic composition of the north. Property issues, displaced persons, missing persons and the military presence are therefore not merely memories of 1974, but remain part of the conflict to this day.
The Greek Cypriot side is not free of responsibility either
Anyone who wants to tell the history accurately must not absolve the other side of responsibility either. In the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, around 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the UN plan, while around 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved it.
That was a serious setback for a concrete reunification attempt and belongs in any honest assessment. The Greek Cypriot side thereby failed to seize a historic opportunity.
But this does not give Ankara a blank check. The current blockade of Turkey’s EU accession does not depend on who voted how in 2004. What matters is that Turkey still does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, does not fully implement existing obligations toward an EU member state, and now openly pursues a two-state solution that is incompatible with the established UN and EU position.
Only one Cypriot state is internationally recognized
For the European Union, the constitutional and international-law starting point is clear. It recognizes only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law. The Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 with its entire territory. In the areas over which its government does not exercise effective control, the application of EU law is suspended until a political solution is reached.
The European Court of Human Rights has found that Turkey exercises effective overall control over northern Cyprus because of its military presence and therefore bears responsibility there under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Politically, the positions have moved even farther apart. The UN and the EU fundamentally continue to support the model of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality. For years, by contrast, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have demanded a two-state solution and sovereign equality.
Under the mediation of the UN Secretary-General, two informal meetings in the expanded five-party format took place in 2025. The fact that talks have resumed is better than a standstill. But talks do not replace rapprochement on the core issue: Ankara remains committed to a model that contradicts the solution previously supported by the international community.
Why Cyprus concretely blocks Turkey’s EU accession
The division of the island is therefore not merely a historical problem, but a very concrete barrier to accession.
Turkey still does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, it refuses to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement fully to Cyprus. This includes, in particular, the equal treatment of all EU member states within the customs union.
The EU Council drew concrete consequences in 2006: Eight negotiating chapters are not opened because of Turkey’s restrictions toward Cyprus. In addition, no further chapter may be provisionally closed as long as Ankara fails to fulfill its obligations under the Additional Protocol.
This contradiction cannot be diplomatically softened: A state can hardly credibly seek membership in a union while failing to recognize one of its members and failing to fulfill key obligations toward it. That is precisely why Cyprus is one of the toughest and clearest reasons for blocking Turkey’s EU accession.
Democracy and the rule of law have developed in the wrong direction
The domestic political development is even more fundamental. The Copenhagen criteria require stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. These are not decorative footnotes to the accession process, but its political foundation.
This is precisely where the European Commission has documented considerable problems for years. The situation deteriorated after the failed coup attempt in 2016. The constitutional referendum of 2017 initiated the transition to a presidential system, which took full effect in 2018 and considerably strengthened the president’s power.
The 2025 EU Progress Report continues to criticize deficiencies in democratic standards, the rule of law, judicial independence and fundamental rights.
Anyone seeking to join the EU does not have to love these rules, but they must comply with them. In key areas, Ankara has moved in the opposite direction. Portraying the deadlock solely as European rejection of Turkey reverses cause and effect.
Ankara has long pursued a different power policy
Erdoğan’s current statement therefore fits into a more fundamental shift. Turkish foreign policy is no longer primarily seeking to become more European. Ankara wants to appear more independent, more powerful regionally and less politically dependent on the West.
Turkey nevertheless remains firmly embedded in Western structures. It has been a NATO member since 1952 and has one of the alliance’s largest armed forces. At the same time, Ankara is seeking strategic room for maneuver in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, repeatedly making decisions that clash with the interests of other NATO and EU states.
The clearest example was the purchase of the Russian air-defense system S-400. The United States removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 and later imposed sanctions. In the current Al Jazeera interview, Erdoğan again spoke about a possible return to the F-35 program.
Ankara therefore wants to retain the advantages of Western integration without substantially restricting its strategic autonomy in return. That may be a legitimate power strategy. But it fits increasingly poorly with the logic of classic EU accession.
Hamas, Israel and the growing political distance from Europe
The political distance is particularly clear in Erdoğan’s Middle East policy. Ankara continues to maintain direct contacts and close political ties with Hamas’s leadership. As recently as April 4, 2026 Erdoğan personally received a Hamas delegation in Istanbul.
This is not an insignificant diplomatic peculiarity. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union. The EU Council expanded its sanctions against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad again in May 2026, adding further members of Hamas’s political bureau to the sanctions list.
Erdoğan, by contrast, regularly does not describe Hamas as a terrorist organization and has pursued an explicitly confrontational line toward Israel for years. In the current interview, too, he once again demonstratively sided with Hamas.
These are not merely nuances clashing with one another. Ankara treats an organization as a political interlocutor that is sanctioned as a terrorist organization in the EU. Anyone who speaks of European membership at the same time cannot simply dismiss this contradiction as a matter of style.
Despite everything, Europe cannot simply ignore Turkey
None of this means that Europe could or should ignore Turkey. Strategic importance and political eligibility for membership are two different things.
Turkey is an important partner economically, in terms of security policy and geographically. The customs union has closely linked the two economic areas for three decades. Added to this are migration, counterterrorism, energy issues, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and the situation between Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
Europe therefore has every interest in talking and cooperating with Ankara. But cooperation is not a discount on accession criteria. Precisely because Turkey is important, clear rules are needed instead of the notion that strategic weight must automatically be translated into political membership.
Economically, Turkey is already closely intertwined with Europe
That is why Erdoğan’s claim about Europe being the loser warrants a look at the figures. Because economically, Turkey is already deeply tied to Europe.
The basis is the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which was agreed at the end of 1995 and became fully effective at the beginning of 1996. At its core, it covers industrial goods. Special trade arrangements exist for agricultural products, while services and public procurement are not integrated to a comparable extent.
According to the European Commission, trade in goods between the EU and Turkey reached a record value of more than €217.6 billion in 2025. This made Turkey the European Union’s fifth-largest trading partner in goods.
From the Turkish perspective, the relationship is even clearer: 42.7 percent of all Turkish goods exports went to the European Union in 2025. 35.3 percent of Turkish goods imports came from the EU. Europe is therefore by far Turkey’s most important trading partner in goods.
Erdoğan can declare Europe the political loser. The trade figures show, at the very least, that Ankara itself would have a great deal to lose if political distance turned into economic decoupling.
ℹ️ The customs union is already functioning
The economic relationship between the EU and Turkey does not begin with a possible accession. Companies on both sides have long been deeply interconnected. Turkish industry in particular is closely integrated into European production and supply chains.
What a modernized customs union could bring
Precisely because full EU accession is hardly foreseeable politically, there has been discussion for years about a modernization of the existing customs union .
The European Commission proposed as early as 2016 expanding economic relations to services, public procurement and other areas, among other things. However, the Council has not yet adopted a corresponding negotiating mandate.
A comprehensive model study commissioned by the European Commission in 2016 examined various forms of such a deepening. For an ambitious expanded trade model, the authors calculated for Turkey an increase in real gross domestic product of around 1.44 percent as well as a welfare gain in the region of approximately €12.5 billion.
However, this figure must be read correctly. It does not mean additional growth of 1.44 percent every year. It is a modeled long-term difference in levels compared with a baseline scenario and is based on assumptions from 2016.
The World Bank, too, concluded in its major evaluation of the customs union that it had significantly advanced the integration of the Turkish economy into European and global markets. According to the model calculation at the time, a hypothetical free trade agreement would have resulted in a lower volume of trade than the existing customs union.
Full accession would go even further economically
Turkey joining the EU would mean far more economically than an expanded customs union. Turkey would be fully integrated into the European single market. This would also include the free movement of people, services and capital, as well as a much more comprehensive adoption of the European acquis.
Older economic studies, including work by the Dutch CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, therefore concluded that the greatest potential gains for Turkey would not arise solely from the removal of trade barriers.
Institutional changes would be particularly important. Improvements in legal certainty, the fight against corruption, competition, independent institutions and investment conditions can have a stronger economic impact than an additional tariff advantage.
This, however, contains a certain political irony: precisely those institutional reforms that generated a large share of the economic benefits in older accession models are now among the areas in which the European Commission identifies backsliding.
Accession would also open access to European structural, cohesion and agricultural funds. Given its size, income level and the importance of agriculture, Turkey would presumably be a net recipient from the EU budget.
What would membership cost Europe?
For the existing European Union, the macroeconomic effects in older model calculations are considerably smaller than for Turkey. Additional trade, a larger single market and new production capacities tend to have a positive effect. The more difficult political and fiscal part would concern the budget, free movement and the integration of a very large new member state.
The European Commission itself noted in 2004 that Turkey’s accession would have significant consequences for the EU budget because of the country’s size and its level of development at the time. Depending on the assumptions, scenarios from that period produced very different figures in the billions.
Simply extrapolating such figures today would be unserious. Agricultural policy, cohesion funds, the EU budget, Turkey’s income level and the size of the Union have changed. There are hardly any current, widely accepted model calculations for Turkish accession in the 2030s.
And that in itself is a political finding: There is hardly any serious calculation for a specific accession anymore, because there is neither a realistic date nor corresponding negotiating momentum. No one can seriously calculate the cost of membership when its timing, conditions, transition periods and financial rules are completely open.
Free movement would be the most politically sensitive economic issue
There is also an issue that directly connects economic and political questions: the free movement of workers.
Full accession would fundamentally change access to the European labor market. As with previous enlargements, transitional arrangements would be conceivable, but in the long term the free movement of people would be a central component of membership.
Older studies therefore considered substantial migration movements possible. However, such model calculations must be treated with particular caution today. Demographic trends, income disparities, labor markets and migration patterns have changed since they were published.
For the EU, competitive effects in labor-intensive sectors, the distribution of cohesion funds and the integration of Turkey’s large agricultural sector would also be relevant issues.
Economically attractive, politically blocked nonetheless
This reveals the real contradiction in this relationship: Economically, Turkey and the EU are closely intertwined. Politically, Ankara has been moving further away from realistic accession for years.
The customs union already gives Turkey considerable benefits from economic integration without requiring Ankara to assume all the political, legal and institutional obligations of EU membership.
Modernization could bring additional benefits to both sides. But it, too, cannot be completely separated from the political relationship. The rule of law, existing obligations toward Cyprus and foreign-policy conflicts directly influence how far Europe is willing to deepen integration.
According to the older models available, full accession would probably provide Turkey with greater additional economic benefits than it would the EU. For Brussels, by contrast, budgetary issues, free movement and the political integration of a very large member state would pose central challenges.
The decisive point, therefore, is not whether trade with Turkey makes sense. Of course it does. The question is whether economic importance is enough to replace political accession criteria. The answer must be no.
The real status quo: cooperation without integration
The status quo is therefore less contradictory than it initially appears: A candidate for accession on paper, a strategic partner in practice, with political integration not foreseeable for the time being.
Brussels is formally keeping the door open. Ankara is not slamming it shut either. Both sides benefit from not officially burying the process. But no one should infer from this that serious accession negotiations are still taking place just outside that door.
Erdoğan can claim that Europe will lose. At the same time, the EU can state that membership without fulfilling the common criteria is not up for discussion.
Turkey is important to Europe. But importance is not an accession criterion, and strategic pressure cannot replace political prerequisites.
Erdoğan’s statement is a political declaration of confrontation. But it obscures why the process is stalled: Cyprus is blocking concrete chapters, Ankara does not recognize an EU member state, and the EU has documented significant problems with the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights for years. Europe can need Turkey as a partner without therefore abandoning its own accession rules.
So who is really losing here?
Erdoğan’s answer is clear: Europe. The facts paint a considerably more uncomfortable picture for Ankara.
Europe would lose an important economic and security partner in a lasting estrangement. That would be neither wise nor without consequences. But Turkey would also lose something very concrete: the prospect of deeper political, institutional and economic integration into a market to which 42.7 percent of its goods exports already go today.
Accession to the EU is not failing because of a single dispute, nor solely because of European skepticism. Ankara does not recognize Cyprus, insists on a two-state solution incompatible with the UN’s previous position, has moved away from the accession criteria in terms of the rule of law and democratic standards, and is deliberately pursuing a more independent course in foreign policy.
The truth also includes the fact that the Greek Cypriot side clearly rejected the Annan Plan in 2004 and therefore bears responsibility itself for a missed opportunity for a solution. But this historical finding does not cancel out Turkey’s present-day obligations.
What is becoming increasingly unlikely, therefore, is not cooperation between Europe and Turkey. Membership is unlikely.
Erdoğan’s statement ultimately makes clear just how much the relationship has changed: Ankara no longer wants to become more European in order to be able to join at some point. It wants to deal with Europe as an independent regional power on an equal footing. That may be what it wants. But then it should not simultaneously pretend that the failure of the accession project is solely Brussels’ fault.
Europe needs Turkey as a partner, but not as a member at any price. Turkey benefits massively from the European market, remains important in security terms, and will continue to be a central neighbor. EU membership, however, requires more than economic importance. As long as Ankara does not recognize Cyprus, fails to fulfill key obligations, and moves away from the EU in terms of the rule of law and political standards, membership remains a theoretical possibility on paper rather than a realistic political prospect.
ℹ️ Factual basis and primary sources for the article 📑
▶️ Al Jazeera:
Erdogan says Egypt could join Turkiye-Saudi-Pakistan defence pact
Report on the current Al Jazeera interview featuring Erdoğan’s statements on the European Union, Hamas and relations with the West.
▶️ Council of the European Union and European Council:
Türkiye
Official chronology of the accession process, information on the chapters opened, the standstill since 2018, and the blocking of eight chapters because of the Additional Protocol and Cyprus.
▶️ European Commission:
Türkiye – EU relations and enlargement
Official overview of candidate status, the accession process and political relations between the EU and Turkey.
▶️ European Commission:
Türkiye Report 2025
Current progress report on democracy, the rule of law, the judiciary, fundamental rights and Turkey’s foreign-policy orientation.
▶️ European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade:
EU trade relations with Türkiye
Current trade data for 2025, as well as information on the customs union, trade in goods and the planned modernization of economic relations.
▶️ European Commission:
Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential Trade Framework
Comprehensive 2016 modeling study on the economic effects of deepening EU-Turkey trade relations.
▶️ World Bank:
Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union
Analysis of the economic effects and structural limitations of the existing customs union.
▶️ CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis:
Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession to the EU
Older modeling analysis of single-market integration, institutional reforms and migration in the event of possible Turkish EU membership.
▶️ European Commission:
Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective
The Commission’s fundamental 2004 impact assessment of the economic, political and budgetary effects of possible membership.
▶️ European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations:
2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy
Current status of the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s two-state position and the informal talks resumed in 2025 under UN mediation.
▶️ United Nations:
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
Official information on the UNFICYP mission, the buffer zone and the continuing division of Cyprus.
▶️ European Court of Human Rights:
Cyprus v. Turkey
Landmark judgment on effective Turkish control over northern Cyprus and Turkey’s responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights.
▶️ NATO:
Türkiye and NATO
Historical and security-policy overview of Turkey’s NATO membership since 1952.
▶️ Council of the European Union:
EU sanctions against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Decision of 28 May 2026 expanding the sanctions framework and concerning further listed individuals.
▶️ Anadolu Agency:
Turkish President Erdogan receives Hamas delegation in Istanbul
Report on Erdoğan’s meeting with a Hamas delegation on 4 April 2026.
▶️ United Nations, Special Rapporteur:
Report on settlers and demographic changes in northern Cyprus
UN report on the settlement of people from Turkey and the effects on the demographic composition in the north of Cyprus.
▶️ United Nations, Secretary-General:
Report of the Secretary-General on Cyprus, 28 May 2004
Documents the results of the 2004 referendums on the Annan Plan on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides.
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