Glyphosate on Israel’s border is documented. What the Süddeutsche Zeitung largely leaves out is the security-policy context. Israeli aircraft sprayed herbicides in the border area with Syria and Lebanon. What is not documented, however, is the narrative that Israel wanted to harass or drive out farmers or destroy their livelihoods out of a sheer desire to cause destruction.

The article describes dead plants, desperate farmers and the suspicion of a planned Israeli land grab in detail. The decisive security-policy connection, by contrast, appears at most as a pale shadow: Dense vegetation in a border area with documented military infrastructure belonging to armed groups provides cover, conceals movements and makes it harder to detect attackers in time.

This turns a real and certainly criticisable military measure into a morally unambiguous story. Israel sprays, farmers suffer, therefore harming the farmers must have been the objective. Good reporting does not work that simply, however.

Glyphosate on Israel’s Border: What Is Actually Documented

On 1 February 2026 the Israeli army informed the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL of an impending air operation near the so-called Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. According to UNIFIL Israel described the substance deployed as non-toxic and demanded that the UN soldiers keep away and remain under cover. According to its own account, UNIFIL had to cancel more than a dozen activities and was only able to resume normal operations along a longer section of the Blue Line after more than nine hours.

The Lebanese army and UNIFIL subsequently took soil samples. The Lebanese ministries of agriculture and the environment said that individual samples showed glyphosate concentrations 20 to 30 times higher than the average in the area. The range of 30 to 50 times the usual dose cited in the Süddeutsche Zeitung article therefore does not match. Several spraying flights were also reported from Syria’s Quneitra province. The United Nations confirmed to the Süddeutsche Zeitung that the aircraft concerned had come from Israel.

It is therefore sufficiently documented that the aircraft came from Israel and that glyphosate was detected at least in Lebanon. Reports of damage to plants and agriculturally used land are also credible. Glyphosate is a non-selective herbicide. It does not distinguish between a bush obstructing military operations, weeds and a grain field.

Other claims are less well substantiated. The 70 villages and 480 hectares cited by Syrian authorities have not yet been confirmed by an independent comprehensive investigation. Nor does the Süddeutsche Zeitung provide a comprehensible calculation of the quantity behind its claim that Israel sprayed glyphosate “by the ton.”

Passende X-Beiträge

Aus dem SCHLAGSEITE X-Archiv

Emanuel Fabian 15.09.2026 · 09:00 Uhr Truppen, die innerhalb Israels Pufferzone im Südlibanon operieren, haben nach Angaben des Militärs eine Kampfstellung der Hisbollah entdeckt, darunter einen mit Raketen bestückten Raketenwerfer… Mena-Watch 18.09.2026 · 07:05 Uhr Während für einige der ehemaligen libanesischen Verbündeten Israel längst zur Heimat geworden ist, betrachten andere weiterhin den Zedernstaat als solche. Die Schwächung der Hisbollah… LTC Ella Waweya 19.09.2026 · 13:46 Uhr Eilmeldung | Als Reaktion auf die Detonation eines Sprengsatzes in der Sicherheitszone: Die israelische Armee greift Infrastruktur der Terrororganisation Hisbollah im Südlibanon an Heute…

The Specific Reason for the Operation Remains Officially Unanswered

The Israeli army has not yet publicly commented on the specific spraying flights in Syria and Lebanon. This means: The exact mission, the designated area, the mixture used and the operational rationale have not been fully documented publicly.

Yet there is likewise no evidence that the flights were intended to drive out Syrian or Lebanese farmers. This interpretation comes primarily from affected residents, Lebanese government representatives and political organisations accusing Israel of a scorched-earth strategy.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung, for example, allows a Syrian farmer to explain at length that Israel wants to keep the population under pressure until it leaves the area. The report formally identifies this as a personal conviction. However, an equally detailed presentation of Israel’s security interest is absent. This turns an unproven assumption into the emotional guiding thread of the entire article.

⚠️ The Crucial Distinction

The fact that farmers are harmed by a military measure does not automatically prove that harming the farmers was the military objective. Effect and intent are two different questions of fact.

Why Armies Remove Vegetation Along Borders

The military rationale for keeping a border corridor clear is neither mysterious nor particularly Israeli. Tall bushes, trees, dense grass and agricultural crops can block lines of sight, interfere with sensors and conceal movement.

The area along the border with Lebanon is not a peaceful allotment garden association, but a place where Hezbollah has built observation posts, weapons depots, launch positions and underground infrastructure over many years. During operations in southern Lebanon, Israeli troops repeatedly found weapons and military facilities in wooded, mountainous and difficult-to-observe terrain.

The Times of Israel reported in February 2026 that Israeli military officials had described the dense vegetation along the Lebanese border as a significant challenge. The outlet added that clearing the vegetation was presumably intended to help identify people approaching the border, entering Israel or preparing attacks. This specific purpose was not an official explanation of the spraying flights.

A comparable security purpose is documented from earlier operations along the Gaza Strip. The army told the Israeli organisation Gisha that the vegetation was to be cleared to enable “optimal and continuous security operations.” Gisha and Forensic Architecture also documented that spray drift reached agricultural land in the Gaza Strip and damaged crops there.

In the Syrian border area, political instability is an additional factor. The collapse of the former Syrian power structure created an area in which state forces, local militias, Islamist groups, Iranian networks and remnants of Hezbollah are competing for influence. The claim that Syria poses no danger to Israel therefore falls short.

It may be true that Syria’s transitional government is currently not seeking an open war with Israel. A government declaration, however, does not prevent armed groups from using areas near the border.

On 29 March 2026 the Israeli army reported an operation by its mountain unit from the Syrian Hermon towards southern Lebanon. According to the IDF, information was gathered and infrastructure discovered that was intended to support future attacks on Israel. This information comes from a party to the conflict and must be assessed accordingly.

The Security Rationale Is Plausible

A comprehensible military objective does not automatically make every implementation lawful or proportionate. A measure intended to improve border surveillance must also be planned in such a way as to minimise damage to foreign territory, civilian fields and the environment wherever possible.

Airborne application in particular carries the risk that wind and spray drift will extend beyond the intended area. Reports of damaged crops must therefore not simply be dismissed as propaganda. Questions about the concentration, weather conditions, safety distances and possible alternatives to broad-area application are equally justified.

Glyphosate is not a prohibited chemical weapon merely because it is applied as a herbicide. The active substance is widely used around the world and is authorised in the European Union subject to conditions until 15 December 2033. Possible health risks are the subject of scientific debate. Regulatory authorities distinguish between a substance’s inherent hazard and the actual risk arising from a specific application.

International law makes the matter more complicated. Under Rule 76 of the International Committee of the Red Cross the use of herbicides as a method of warfare may be prohibited, for example when vegetation that is not a military objective is attacked, when disproportionate civilian damage is to be expected, or when far-reaching, long-term and severe environmental damage threatens. Whether these thresholds were exceeded in the specific spraying operations cannot be seriously determined without complete operational data and an independent investigation.

How 800 Million Dollars Became Glyphosate Damage

Particularly problematic is a figure with which the Süddeutsche Zeitung emphasises the scale of the damage. The automatically generated summary states that the Lebanese agriculture minister had put the damage at 800 million US dollars.

This inevitably creates the impression in readers’ minds that the glyphosate sprayed caused damage on that scale. But that is not what the minister’s original statement says.

Nizar Hani told L’Orient-Le Jour, the sum of 800 million dollars referred to a three-year plan to rebuild Lebanon’s entire agricultural sector. It included direct war damage, bombed areas, destroyed infrastructure, cleared or burned olive groves, crop failures and further losses since the fighting began.

The 800 million dollars are not an estimate of the damage caused by the glyphosate operation. Citing this figure in an article about the spraying flights without this crucial qualification is at least seriously misleading.

What the Süddeutsche Tells Its Readers—and What It Leaves Out

The Süddeutsche Zeitung chooses a clear narrative structure. On one side are helpless farmers, dead plants and the suspicion of planned displacement. On the other is a silent Israel that allegedly occupies more and more land and acts without any serious threat.

What is largely missing is the border reality after the massacre of 7 October 2023, Hezbollah’s years of military preparation in southern Lebanon and the repeated rocket, drone and anti-tank attacks on Israeli communities.

It is likewise scarcely explained why clear lines of sight, controllable border corridors and the protection of observation facilities are militarily relevant. Instead, a Syrian farmer’s personal displacement theory is given broad space, while Israel’s security logic remains practically unrepresented.

This is not a completely false report. It is something more journalistically insidious: a real fact is placed within such a one-sided interpretive framework that the reader comes to regard an unproven intention as established.

Criticism Does Not Need an Invented Intention

Israel must explain what substance was sprayed, in what quantity, how the target areas were determined and what measures were taken to prevent drift onto agricultural land. An independent assessment of the ecological consequences would be appropriate. A democratic state loses nothing by explaining a military measure transparently and in a legally comprehensible manner.

Good journalism, however, must likewise detach itself from political narratives. The damage to fields is real. The constructed intention of driving out farmers and making foreign land permanently uninhabitable has not been substantiated so far.

The obvious explanation, known from previous operations but not officially confirmed for these specific flights, is: Israel removes vegetation in immediate border areas because terrorist organisations and armed groups can use dense vegetation as cover, an approach route and protection from reconnaissance.

One can debate whether glyphosate is the appropriate means for this. Possible border violations, environmental damage and a lack of transparency can be criticised. What one should not do is cut the military reality out of the picture and then pretend that the harm to Arab farmers alone is the discernible purpose.

✔️ In summary

Israeli spraying flights and damage to plants have been substantiated. A targeted strategy to expel or destroy farmers has not been substantiated. A security purpose involving the removal of cover and improved border surveillance is plausible and known from previous operations, but was not officially confirmed for these specific flights. Whether the scale, concentration and cross-border effects were proportionate must be independently examined.

Anyone wishing to criticise Israel does not need an invented motive. The verifiable questions are serious enough. That is precisely why a newspaper should not bury them beneath a more emotionally effective story.