The 2026 Hamas Palestinian election could lead to a new political power struggle. The terrorist organization wants to stand in the planned Palestinian parliamentary elections and thereby regain a political foothold. While its disarmament is one of the central conditions for a new order in the Gaza Strip, an uncomfortable question arises for Israel: What would be gained if Hamas were weakened militarily, only to regain political influence through the ballot box afterward?

Hussam Badran, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, told Al-Aqsa TV that the organization wanted to participate in the planned elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and was seeking a broad national coalition. The election is scheduled for November 28, 2026 and would be the first Palestinian parliamentary election in 20 years. This was reported by the Jerusalem Post.

The announced Hamas Palestinian election is, however, primarily a political signal at this stage. Whether the organization can actually stand, under what conditions voting will take place and whether a nationwide vote can be held at all remains far from certain.

Hamas Palestinian Election: The Experience of 2006

The background explains why Israel is likely to view possible renewed Hamas participation in the election with particular concern.

In the parliamentary election of January 25, 2006, Hamas won 74 of 132 seats, while Fatah won 45. The two were much closer in terms of the nationwide vote share: Hamas received around 44 percent and Fatah around 41 percent. The EU Election Observation Mission assessed the electoral process overall as open and fairly contested.

One year later, the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah escalated. In 2007, Hamas violently seized control of the Gaza Strip. Since then, the Palestinian political system has remained divided between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas rule in Gaza. The SCHLAGSEITE article “October 7 came as a surprise. The escalation did not.” also shows how Hamas rule developed after Israel’s withdrawal.

The decisive point is therefore: Hamas’s participation in an election has not moderated it before. The parliamentary success of 2006 meant neither the end of the armed struggle nor a fundamental ideological change.

Today’s Hamas Palestinian election must therefore also be assessed against the backdrop of this experience. A democratic vote does not automatically change an organization’s political or ideological goals.

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A Candidacy Is Still a Long Way from Participating in an Election

There are also considerable practical obstacles.

Palestinian elections cannot be organized independently of Israel. As early as 2006, the EU Election Observation Mission determined that the electoral process was highly dependent on Israeli cooperation. Freedom of movement, access to polling stations, campaigning and, in particular, voting in Jerusalem were central points of dispute at the time. At the same time, Israeli authorities ultimately enabled sufficient organizational cooperation for the election to take place.

In 2026, the political and security situation would be far more complicated.

In Judea and Samaria, Israel has extensive security-related means of action. An open Hamas infrastructure with candidates, campaign offices, events and organizational networks would inevitably come up against Israeli security interests. How Israel would respond in concrete terms is currently unclear. The assumption that Hamas could conduct a normal campaign there like an ordinary party would, however, be hardly realistic.

Jerusalem also remains a potential point of conflict. Even before the 2006 election, there were considerable disputes over whether and under what conditions Palestinian residents of Jerusalem could participate.

Badran’s announcement therefore initially shows above all that Hamas wants to remain part of the Palestinian power structure even after the war. There are, however, considerable legal, organizational and security-related hurdles between this political intention and actual participation in the election.

How Could Voting Take Place in the Gaza Strip at All?

The practical questions in the Gaza Strip are even greater.

The local elections in April 2026 could take place there only in Deir al-Balah The city was less severely destroyed than other parts of Gaza. Hamas did not officially stand, but a list attributed to it won two of 15 seats. Voter turnout was only around 23 percent, as Reuters reported.

A parliamentary election would be on an entirely different scale.

Large parts of Gaza remain severely damaged, a significant portion of the population is living in makeshift conditions, and the future security order is unclear. At the center of any long-term reorganization remains the question of Hamas’s disarmament. The SCHLAGSEITE article “Gaza, Hamas and the Convenient Perpetrator-Victim Narrative” also shows why this issue extends far beyond military questions.

It is therefore entirely unclear who could secure polling stations, enable campaigning, protect candidates and guarantee a credible process in November.

The fixed date alone does not make the Hamas Palestinian election a realistically feasible political process.

Abbas Sets Conditions, Hamas Rejects Them

Participation is by no means settled on the Palestinian side either.

Following the latest amendment to the electoral law, the Palestinian Legislative Council is once again to comprise 132 seats The threshold remains at one percent, while the minimum age for candidates remains 23. At the same time, the requirement remains that candidates and electoral lists recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, along with its political and national foundations. This was confirmed by the Palestinian Central Election Commission. Badran rejects political conditions of this kind for Hamas’s participation.

This raises a decisive question even before the campaign begins: Does Hamas want to fit into an existing political order, or merely use its electoral process without recognizing its foundations?

There is little evidence so far of a recognizable ideological U-turn. Badran continued to place Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the release of Palestinian prisoners at the center of his organization’s political agenda.

The message is therefore not that Hamas is abandoning its previous policy. Rather, it is trying to keep open an additional political path back to influence and power.

A Hamas Victory Would Have International Consequences

A possible electoral victory would affect not only Israel and the Palestinian institutions.

After Hamas’s 2006 election victory, the Quartet on the Middle East—comprising the United States, the EU, Russia and the United Nations—made clear that members of a future Palestinian government would have to be committed to renouncing violence, recognizing Israel and accepting existing agreements International support was also to be reviewed according to these criteria.

This fundamental problem has not disappeared to this day. The EU continues to pursue a policy of no regular contacts with Hamas, while the organization remains sanctioned as a terrorist organization.

A renewed Hamas election victory could therefore trigger a conflict between the election result, international funding and diplomatic recognition.

This exact problem had already emerged after the 2006 election. A new Hamas Palestinian election would raise the same fundamental question again: How should Western states and international donors deal with a political system in which a terrorist organization gains substantial institutional influence through elections?

Hamas Palestinian Election: Disarmament Alone Is Not Enough for Israel

For Israel, this is the actual core of the announced candidacy. The Hamas Palestinian election concerns not only the composition of Palestinian institutions, but also Israel’s security interests directly.

Even successful military disarmament would not automatically answer the political question.

If Hamas subsequently gained substantial influence over Palestinian institutions through elections, the organization would be militarily weakened but would remain part of the power structure politically.

That is why Badran’s announcement is relevant already, even if the election is postponed or Hamas ultimately cannot stand. It shows how the organization views its own future: not as a force that has been eliminated, but as an actor seeking a way back into Palestinian politics.

In 2006, Israel ultimately allowed the Palestinian election to take place despite considerable concerns and restrictions. The result was a Hamas victory, followed a year later by the violent takeover of power in Gaza.

Twenty years later, Jerusalem is unlikely to have the same expectations regarding the political impact of Hamas’s participation in an election.

A Hamas without a rocket arsenal would be a security-policy success. A Hamas that subsequently regains power through the ballot box would nevertheless remain an unresolved problem.